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Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001700090116-0

SECRET Approved For Release 2009/03/17: CIA-RDP86M00886R001700090116-0 Executive Registry 84 - 2873 3 July 1984 Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Coups 1. A few days before Bob went off on vacation, I suggested to him that we should get a study done on coups--warnings, nature, aftermath, etc. He said he would assign that to the Center for Instability and Insurgency in OGI. 2. A point was given to this concept by the aborted Bolivian coup over last weekend. The interesting thing about that is that it may be the kind of aborted coup which is a precursor of a more successful coup from the other direction. An unsuccessful military coup followed by retaliation against the military can open up an opportunity and improve the chances of a coup from the left. It probably also works vice versa. 25X1 On Sunday I met at the barbecue for the diplomatic corps at the White House. He brought up the Bolivian coup and mentioned to 25X1₁ had sent him two papers on coups d'etat done by me that I attach copies which may be useful in the 25X1 projects I discussed with Bob. William J. Casev Attachments: Ltr to 25X1 dated 4 April 1984, w/two attachments--25X1 25X1

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